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feature article

Recent Supreme Court Arbitration Rulings
Affect Employment and Class Action
Arbitrations
by Professor Kristen M. Blankley 1

The United States Supreme Court remains active in the area
of arbitration law, deciding between one and three arbitration
cases per term over the course of the last five or so years.
Despite their recentness, many of these arbitration decisions
are already considered “landmark” cases, drastically affecting
the way attorneys, arbitrators, and judges approach arbitration
cases. This short article recounts some of the most important
arbitration decisions of the last decade, focusing on cases
relating to labor and employment issues and class action issues.
The first section of this article considers cases dealing
with labor and employment issues, as well as statutory issues.
This section focuses primarily on the 2009 case of 14 Penn
Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009),
which upheld the enforceability of a provision in a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) requiring individual union
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members to arbitrate their statutory claims. The second
section of this article primarily considers the Stolt-NielsenJackson-Concepcion “trilogy” of cases dealing with class action
and arbitrability issues.

Part I – Labor/Employment and
Statutory Claims Cases
Until the Pyett decision, the realms of labor arbitration
and employment arbitration remained relatively separate. In
the employment sphere, the Supreme Court has consistently
enforced arbitration agreements between employers and
individual employees following the 1991 landmark case of
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp, 500 U.S. 20 (1991).2
The Gilmer Court essentially held that employees can
effectively vindicate their statutory rights in the arbitral forum
and that the waiver of a jury trial was not a waiver of the
protections afforded by the employment statutes, such as the
Age Discrimination in Employment Act.3
Unlike the area of employment law, the precedent in the area
of labor law was considerably less favorable towards arbitration
of statutory claims of individual union members. In 1974, the
Supreme Court decided in Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415
U.S. 36 (1974), that an employer could not compel a unionrepresented employee to arbitrate statutory claims because of
the potential conflict of interest between the union and the
employee.4 In Wright v. Universal Maritime Services, Corp.,
525 U.S. 70 (1998), the Court further held that a unionized
employee could not be required to submit a statutory claim to
arbitration unless the CBA “clearly and unmistakably” waived
the judicial forum within the CBA. Prior to Pyett, however,
many lower courts, as well as many practitioners, read Gardner-
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Denver and Wright to mean that unions could not waiver the
judicial forum for the resolution of individual union member’s
cases involving statutory rights.

the Pyett decision simply answered the open question in Wright
regarding the ability of a union to waive the judicial forum for
its members for the resolution of statutory rights.

The Supreme Court in Pyett, however, held exactly the
opposite. The Pyett case involves a CBA for a group of
employees in the building-services industry, such as cleaners,
porters, and doorpersons. The CBA specifically required that
claims for discrimination falling under Title VII, the ADA, the
ADEA, and other similar laws “be subject to the grievance and
arbitration process . . . as the sole remedy for violations.” Pyett,
129 S. Ct. at 1461. The Court flatly rejected the argument that
a collective bargaining unit could not waive the judicial forum
for the resolution of the employee’s individual statutory rights.
Id. at 1464. The Court rejected the employees’ argument that
“the arbitration clause here is outside the permissible scope
of the collective-bargaining process because it affects the
‘employee’s individual, non-economic statutory rights.” Id.
(internal quotation marks omitted). According to the Court, if
a union wanted to waive the judicial forum in these cases, such a
concession on the part of the union could be made “in return for
other concessions from the employer[, and that c]ourts generally
may not interfere in this bargained-for exchange.” Id. In other
words, the litigation forum can be bargained for in the same
manner as wages, hours, and other terms of the agreement.

Although not a labor decision, the 2012 decision in
Compucredit Corp. v. Greenwood, No. 10-948, 565 U.S. ___
(2012), further upholds the ruling in Gilmer and continues to
support the arbitrability of statutory claims. Compucredit involves
a class action claim by consumers under the Credit Repair
Organizations Act (CROA) for alleged misrepresentations
made to them regarding the available credit limits under
certain credit cards and the fees associated with those cards.
Id. The CROA requires that creditors give certain notices to
cardholders, one of which states that the cardholders have a
“right to sue a credit repair organization.” Id. The act also has
a non-waiver provision, meaning that any attempt by the credit
repair organization to waive the protections of the statute would
be void. In Compucredit, the plaintiffs received the requisite
disclosure, but the contracts also had arbitration agreements.

With respect to the Denver-Gardner line of cases, the
Court read that case (and cases following Gardner-Denver) as
one not involving a contract that provided for the arbitration
of statutory claims. Id. at 1467 (citing Gardner-Denver, 415
U.S. at 49-50). Instead, the Court read these cases for the
question of the procedure involving subsequent litigation in
cases in which the CBA covers some grievances (non-statutory)
but not others (statutory claims). Id. at 1468-69. The Court
also rejected the conflict-of-interest argument, holding that
“unions certainly balance the economic interests of some
employees against the needs of the larger work force . . . [b]
ut this attribute of organized labor does not justify singling out
an arbitration provision for disfavored treatment.” Id. at 1472.
Given that statutory claims can be arbitrated, the second
question for the court was an easy one – does the ADEA permit
the arbitration of claims falling under the statute? Clearly the
answer to this question is “yes,” and has been “yes,” ever since
the Court decided Gilmer in 1991. On this point, the Court
stated that the “Gilmer Court’s interpretation of the ADEA
fully applies in the collective-bargaining context. Nothing in
the law suggests a distinction between the status of arbitration
agreements signed by an individual employee and those agreed
to by a union representative.” Pyett, 129 S. Ct. at 1465. The
Court reaffirmed its earlier precedent that the “waiver” involved
in the case is not the waiver of a statutory right, but only the
waiver of a judicial forum. Id. (citing Wright, 525 U.S. at 80).
Given that the waiver in this case was clear and unmistakable,
THE NEBRASKA LAWYER
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The question for the Court was whether the arbitration
agreement constituted a waiver of `the “right to sue” provision, thus
voiding the contractual requirement to arbitrate. Unsurprisingly,
the Court found the claim arbitrable and found that the
requirements under the CROA are to provide a Congressionallywritten notice to consumers, and nothing more. Id. Just as
in the long line of cases culminating with Gilmer, the Court
examined the legislation at issue to determine whether Congress
intended to preclude the waiver of the judicial forum in cases
falling under the statute. Id. (citing Gilmer, Shearson/American
Express Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (involving RICO),
and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 472
U.S. 614 (1985) (involving the Clayton Act)). The Court found
nothing in the text of the CROA that would guarantee a judicial
forum but only that the power to impose liability (be it in a
specific court or in arbitration) be preserved. Id. If Congress
had intended to provide a judicial forum, the Court reasoned that
the legislation should have specifically stated that arbitration of
such statutory claims not be allowed. Because Congress was not
so specific, then the arbitration of such claims is not prohibited.
Reading Compucredit and Pyett together, the Court has
continued its strong pro-arbitration stance in both the labor
context and the statutory context. If Congress does not intend
for the arbitration of claims under certain statutes, then the
burden is on Congress to put within the text of the legislation
(or clearly within the legislative history) language indicating that
parties cannot waive their right to a judicial forum for resolution
of disputes under the statutes. Simply making a judicial recourse
for wronged parties is not enough because the Court has now
consistently held that the provision of a judicial forum is not
necessarily a barrier to the arbitration of cases under those statutes.
On the Congressional side, recent years have shown
some signs of increased activism on the part of Congress to
j u ly / a u g u st 2 0 1 2
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intervene and limit the ability of parties to arbitrate. Over the
course of the last five years, Congresspersons have introduced
differing versions of the Arbitration Fairness Act (AFA) that
would have the effect of nullifying all pre-dispute arbitration
agreements in the employment, consumer, and civil rights
contexts. Although the passage of such a broad AFA appears
unlikely (and likely ill advised) in today’s political climate,
recent attempts to limit arbitration in certain contexts has been
a more successful solution for anti-arbitration supporters. For
instance, Congress passed the Jamie Leigh Jones/Al Franken
Amendment, which prohibits the use of pre-dispute arbitration
agreements for tort claims (such as battery or sexual assault) in
employment agreements with defense contractors. Similarly,
Al Franken (and others) introduced the Consumer Mobile
Fairness Act (CMFA), which would invalidate pre-dispute
arbitration clauses with consumers purchasing wireless services.
At this time, it is still unclear how many CBAs will include
Pyett-inspired arbitration clauses covering statutory claims, and
the commentators have certainly split on whether such clauses
are a good idea.5 Given the Supreme Court’s consistent rulings
with respect to arbitrability of statutory claims, unless Congress
intervenes in a systematic way (such as through a bill like the
AFA) or in a piecemeal, industry-specific manner (such as the
CMFA), those with contracts to arbitrate statutory claims will
likely be unsuccessful in arguing that they cannot vindicate
their statutory rights in the arbitral forum.

Part II – Cases Involving Class Actions
and Arbitrability
The second line of noteworthy cases of the past few years
deals with the issues of class actions and arbitrability. Class
action arbitration is an important topic in employment law, and
these cases are equally applicable to the employment context,
although they involved factual situations in the consumer and
commercial contexts.
The first class-action arbitration case the Supreme Court
decided was Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle, 538 U.S.
444 (2003). The Bazzle case concerned the issue of who
decided whether claimants in arbitration could proceed as a
class when the arbitration clause at issue does not address the
issue (i.e., the clause is “silent”). A plurality of the Supreme
Court ruled that the arbitrator – not the court – should have
decided whether the class procedure was supported by the
arbitration clause. Following Bazzle, the American Arbitration
Association (AAA) responded and created Supplemental Rules
for Class Arbitrations (Supplemental Rules) and a public Class
Arbitration docket.6 Under the Supplemental Rules, arbitrators
are tasked with determining whether a silent contract supports
a class arbitration. Supplemental R. 3.7 The AAA created a
successful class arbitration program, handling hundreds of cases.8
THE NEBRASKA LAWYER
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One of the cases to go through the AAA process was StoltNielsen, S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S.Ct. 1758 (2010).
Stolt-Nielsen involved a case between business parties in an
international shipping contract. The arbitration agreement at
issue did was silent on the issue of class arbitration, and the
AAA arbitrator ruled that the silent clause could be construed to
support class arbitration. Id. at 1765-66. The Stolt-Nielsen court
held that a silent arbitration clause cannot be read to permit a
class-action procedure, and that the Bazzle case did not support
the proposition that a silent clause could be read to permit such
a procedure. Id. at 1772. In fact, the Court went so far as to
hold that the arbitrators “exceeded their powers” under §10 of
the FAA, which is a standard of review considered to be quite
limited. The Supreme Court found that a silent clause did not
evidence an agreement to participate in class arbitration “because
class-action arbitration changes the nature of arbitration to such
a degree that it cannot be presumed the parties consented to it
by simply agreeing to submit their disputes to an arbitrator.” Id.
at 1775. The Court stressed the differences between bilateral
arbitration and class arbitration, such as the number of parties,
the lack of confidentiality, the involvement of absent parties,
and the stakes involved in the case. Id. at 1776. Under these
circumstances, the Court ruled that parties could not have a class
procedure if the agreement to arbitrate is silent on the issue.
The Court’s more recent decision in AT&T Mobility v.
Concepcion, No. 09-893 (2010), takes the Stolt-Nielsen decision
a step further. While Stolt-Nielsen dealt with a case involving
an arbitration clause silent on the issue of class actions, the
Concepcion case involved an express ban on the use of classwide
arbitration. The plaintiffs in Concepcion filed suit against one
of AT&T’s predecessors to recover false advertising damages
in the amount of $30.22 per person in fees charged for a “free
phone.” The plaintiffs claimed that the class action arbitration
ban was unconscionable under California law. At the time,
California law included an unconscionability test known as the
Discover Bank test that invalidated class action waivers in the
consumer context if the plaintiff could prove that the dispute
involved predictably small amount of damages, and that the
party with the greater bargaining power carried out a scheme
to exploit a large amount of people out of a small amount of
money each. The lower courts found the class action waiver
unconscionable and void under the Discover Bank rule.
The Supreme Court reversed the decision, holding that the
FAA preempted the Discover Bank rule. The Court held that,
although the Discover Bank rule did not single out arbitration
in its text, the rule would have “a disproportionate impact on
arbitration agreements” and “interferes with arbitration. Id.
The Court then reaffirmed its decision in Stolt-Nielsen, again
emphasizing the differences between bilateral arbitration and
class arbitration. Those differences include the fact that class
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arbitration is “slower, more costly, and more likely to generate
procedural morass than final judgment.” Id. The Court was
also concerned about the increased required formality of class
arbitration and how bilateral arbitration was not intended to have
such procedural formality. The Court also expressed skepticism
on the part of the arbitrators’ ability to handle class cases.
Thus, under Concepcion, class action waivers appear to be
enforceable. Reading Stolt-Nielsen and Concepcion together,
the only way that consumers (or employees, for that matter)
can have a class action procedure in arbitration is if the parties
specifically allow for class arbitration, which is highly unlikely.
For companies and employers, now, all they need to do is to not
say anything at all about class arbitration to prohibit the action,
and the waivers are less likely to be found unconscionable
following Concepcion.
The final case in the recent arbitration “trilogy” is the
2010 case of Rent-a-Center v. Jackson, 130 S.Ct. 2772 (2010).
Although Jackson does not deal with class actions, it does
deal with the power of arbitrators to determine questions of
arbitrability. Jackson involved an employment claim and an
arbitration agreement that gave the arbitrator the ability to
determine his or her own jurisdiction (the “delegation clause”).
Jackson challenged the arbitration agreement as unconscionable,
and the question before the Court was who was to decide the
question of unconscionability. Applying the “separability”
principles of Prima Paint, the Court held that any challenge to an
agreement with a delegation clause could only be leveled against
the delegation clause. In other words, the unconscoinability
challenge could not be made to the arbitration agreement as a
whole, but only to the delegation clause. Id. at 2780.
The fallout of Jackson is that an increased number of
decisions can be delegated to an arbitrator, including decisions
regarding the creation of the arbitration agreement. After
Jackson, companies would be well advised to include delegation
clauses in their contracts in order to insulate the agreement
from challenge and to give as many questions as possible to an
arbitrator and out of the courts.9 In reading all three of these
cases together, the Supreme Court has been extraordinary
friendly to business interests. Business can now impose upon
consumers and employees arbitration agreements that require
individual arbitration and that have the arbitrators, by and
large, determining their own jurisdiction and the defenses to
nearly all of the possible challenges to the mediation agreement.

dispute arbitration clauses in consumer and employment cases.
The Supreme Court has deeply entrenched itself into these
positions, and Congressional action appears to be the only way
to change the precedent set forth by the Court.

Endnotes
1

Assistant Professor of Law, University of Nebraska College of
Law. J.D., Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, 2004.

2

In 2001, the Supreme Court’s decision in Circuit City Stores,
Inc. v. Adams, 352 U.S. 105 (2001), made clear that the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq., applied to all workers
engaged in interstate commerce with the exception of certain interstate transportation workers, such as railroad employees or seamen.

3

Of course, an employee could challenge an arbitration agreement on other grounds. For instance, in Green Tree Financial
Corporation of Alabama v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000), the
Supreme Court left open the possibility that plaintiffs could prove
that the financial burden of arbitration could impede an employee’s
ability to vindicate his or her statutory rights. In addition, arbitration agreements can be challenged on the grounds of a contractlaw defense under §2 of the FAA, such as unconscionability or
duress. For a classic example of an unconscionable agreement to
arbitrate in the employment context, see Hooters of America, Inc. v.
Phillips, 173 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1999). The arbitration agreement
in the Hooters case included lopsided obligations on the parts of
the employer and employee and included a provision that allowed
Hooters to control the pool of potential arbitrators.

4

Labor unions operate to protect the majority, and not necessarily
the individual employee. Accordingly, the rights of the majority
will prevail over the rights of the individual if the two sets of
rights conflict. For example, a union is legitimately permitted
to forgo pursing some grievances to the final step (i.e., arbitration) of the dispute resolution procedure if the costs of such
a procedure would pose a concern to the financial well-being
of the union as a whole. Michael Z. Green, Examining the
Current Merger of Labor and Employment Arbitration, 2011 ABA
Section of Labor and Employment Law ADR in Labor and
Employment Law Committee Mid-Winter Meeting, at 6.

5

See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, The Pretext of Textualism:
Disregarding Stare Decisis in 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 825 (2010); Sarah Rudolph Cole, Let
the Grand Experiment Begin: Pyett Authorizes Arbitration of
Unionized Employees’ Statutory Discrimination Claims, 14 LEWIS
& CLARK L. REV. 861 (2010); David L. Gregory & Edward
McNamara, Mandatory Labor Arbitration of Statutory Claims,
and the Future of Fair Employment: 14 Penn Plaza v. Pyett, 19
CORNELL J. L & PUB. POLICY 429 (2010); Brendan D.
Cummis & Nicole M. Blissenbach, The Law of the Land in Labor
Arbitration: The Impact of 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 25 ABA J.
OF LAB. & EMP. L. 159 (Winter 2010).

6

The Supplemental Rules can be found at: http://www.adr.org/
sp.asp?id=21936.

7

The Supplemental Rules provide for a three-step class-arbitration
process. In the first step, the arbitrator examines the contract to
determine whether a class procedure can even occur. If the case
passes the first step, then the second step involves the arbitrator
determining whether to certify a class, using a standard similar to
the standards set forth in the civil rules (Civil Rule 23). Finally,
the arbitrator decides the case on the merits. The Supplemental
Rules also give the participants an opportunity to appeal the decision following the conclusion of each of these stages.

8

The AAA still has more than 300 active cases on its class action
docket.

9

An argument exists that arbitrators would be more likely to rule
in a self-serving manner and find that the agreements are not
unconscionable so that they can keep working on the case and
resolve the merits of the dispute. Any instance in which arbitrators rule on their own jurisdiction poses potential questions of
bias and self-serving in the decision-making process.

Conclusion
The Supreme Court’s interest in arbitration remains strong,
and the consistent messages that ring from the Court’s decisions
support the arbitration of individual claims and increased
power in the hands of the arbitrator. How parties – particularly
businesses and employers – react will be something that time
will tell, but it might be safe to anticipate increased use of preTHE NEBRASKA LAWYER
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